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ABSTRACT 
We estimate the productivity dynamics of 680 industrial Chinese 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) between 1980 and 1994. During this 
time managerial autonomy over factor markets was introduced. The 
timing of autonomy varied across SOEs and take-up was an 
endogenous process: high-productivity SOEs where more likely to 
take managerial control. We allow for this by adapting an algorithm 
developed in Olley & Pakes (1996) in order to generate estimates of 
productivity dynamics that deal with both simultaneity and 
endogenous selection biases. Apart from offering a methodology to 
estimate productivity dynamics during endogenous institutional 
change, we demonstrate that SOEs in China obtained productivity 
gains from managerial autonomy over factor markets in the years 
before privatisation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this paper is to outline a methodology that estimates the 
parameters of a production function but allows for the level and changes in the 
unobservable to be affected by discrete endogenous enterprise-level institutional 
change, among other factors. This is achieved by adapting an algorithm developed in 
Olley and Pakes (1996) and applying it to a balanced panel of 680 SOE’s the 
industrial sector of the Chinese economy with annual observations for the period 1980 
to 1994, which was gathered by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, with the aid 
of the universities of Oxford and California
1. The motivation for choosing an adapted 
version of the Olley & Pakes (1996) algorithm is to allow for productivity to be 
dynamic, while controlling for simultaneity and a particular type of selection bias. 
Rather than allowing for a selection bias due to entry and exit of companies, as in 
Olley & Pakes (1996), our selection bias results from an entry rule into a reform that 
creates unbalanced panels of SOE’s in reformed and unreformed states, a discrete 
choice, whose adoption dates are enterprise specific and depend on the productivity 
type of the enterprise, among other factors.   
The Olley & Pakes (1996) approach postulates a structural model of the 
unobservable, which suggests that a selection rule and investment dynamics of 
enterprises, given the observable state variables, should allow one to control 
effectively for the omitted unobservable (productivity) using a non-parametric 
techniques. This allows one to get consistent estimates of the β’s on labour and 
                                                 
1  Groves et al. (1994), (1995) and Li, (1997) have used the same data covering the period 1980-89 and 
Li and Wu (2002) extend the data for 1990-1994. These papers also use a production function approach 
to evaluate the reform process but there are three key issues not addressed by them that are the focus of 
this paper. First, they correct for simultaneity bias by using a naïve within group estimator, which 
assumes productivity to be time invariant. Secondly, they do not allow for selection bias coming from 
an endogenous reform process, i.e. they assume the tendency to reform is assumed to be a random 
process and not linked to productivity considerations. Finally, our analysis incorporates a reform 
overlooked by other studies. These reforms are equivalent to the final separation of control from 
ownership, since they give enterprise managers autonomy in decisions regarding hiring and firing of 
labour, the buying and selling of capital assets, investment decisions, and the ability to buy 
(intermediates) and sell (final or intermediates goods) on international markets. These reforms were 
largely taken up as a package by enterprise managers but at different points of time during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Initial or preparatory reforms during the 1980s, such as increased output 
autonomy, payment of wage bonuses, and devolution of general control from the centre to the region, 
and the use, in part, of market prices, are not considered here, as several studies have failed to link 
productivity gains to these. While the early reforms where necessary for the implementation of further 
reform  researchers have not been able to link productivity to initial reforms in a significant way, see Li 
and Wu (2002) and Groves et al. (1994). Indeed, Coady and Wang (2000) provide evidence that rent 
sharing was driving the allocation of bonuses in Chinese SOEs with little efficiency gain.   2
capital, amongst other observables. A consistent productivity index for each enterprise 
can then be backed out as a residual in the production function. 
Even though Olley & Pakes (1996) motivate their structural (theoretical 
model) of the unobservable with Ericson and Pakes (1995), which assumes the 
existence of Markov perfect Nash equilibrium over-time, the econometric technique is 
operational when investment sequences and adoption of reform are weakly rational, 
driven in some part by observable and unobservable state variables
2.  In other words 
the technique does not require investment dynamics and adoption of reform in 
Chinese State Owned Enterprises to be optimal but they have to be weakly related to 
economic factors such as enterprise level productivity. We argue that this is the case. 
It is noteworthy, that during the sample period enterprises were signed up to the 
“contract responsibility system”. The contract had profit and tax targets to be paid to 
the government and, failing this, managers would forgo a bond posted prior to the 
contract. In return, managers and workers would be paid agreed bonuses. They also 
had the right to divert retained profits to a welfare and investment fund. Even though 
incentive problems were not solved, clearly planners would target investment at 
enterprises where profit and taxes were channelled back to Government. Investment 
dynamics and adoption of reform should be driven in some part by the unobservable 
productivity type and hence we can use Olley & Pakes (1996), selection rules and 
investment dynamics of enterprises to control for the omitted unobservable 
(productivity) using semi-parametric techniques in our estimation of production 
functions. Having consistent estimates of the β’s on observables we hope to back out 
consistent productivity dynamics for each enterprise.  
 What is interesting about our set-up is that managerial autonomy over factor 
markets are introduced at different times to different enterprises, which all remain 
under state ownership. Thus, we make a contribution to the ownership-versus-control 
debate, which attempts to tackle the question as to whether significant performance 
gains through competitive pressures are possible by operational reform only, or 
whether private ownership is essential for this. Our results indicate that enterprises 
that embrace managerial autonomy over factor markets under State Ownership exhibit 
                                                 
2 Another approach would be to use a “system” GMM estimator, such as Blundell, Bond and 
Windmeijer (2000). The simultaneity bias is addressed by modelling the unobservable as a dynamic 
error component model and they use linear and non-linear moment restrictions on the error structure for 
identification. This parametric structure is not theoretically well motivated and the extension of this 
approach to also address the problem of an “endogenous” reform dummy is not straight forward.   3
higher productivity compared to enterprises in the initial stages of reform, controlling 
for simultaneity and selection biases. Most western studies that have failed to find 
efficiency gains from privatisation argue that State Owned Companies tend to operate 
with competitive pressures in factor and product markets pre-privatisation, and hence 
the contributions of privatisation are hard to isolate, see Walsh and Whelan (2001) for 
an overview. This paper presents us with nice piece of evidence that supports this 
view.  
In our example a clear relationship between the adoption of managerial control 
of factor markets and improvements in SOE productivity over-time can be 
documented but only when we allow for the unobservable to be affected by 
endogenous enterprise-level institutional change in the estimation of the parameters of 
the production function.  Naïve OLS, GLS estimators and even an Olley & Pakes 
(1996) algorithm that allows for productivity to be dynamic and controls for only 
simultaneity biases, treating reform as a state or exogenous variable, do not give us 
clear-cut results.  
 The methodology to allow for selection biases resulting from enterprise level 
reform sequences in the estimation of productivity, can easily be applied to other 
areas of economic interest, such as evaluating productivity across groups defined by 
exporting versus non-exporting status, state versus private ownership and domestic 
versus foreign outsourcing of intermediate inputs
3. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides the 
reader with the background of enterprise reform in China. Then the behavioural 
model of Olley and Pakes (1996) and the estimation procedure are outlined, as is its 
adaptation to our particular problem, in section III. Our results and conclusions are set 
out in sections IV and V, respectively.  
 
 
                                                 
3 See Jan De Loecker (2004) addresses the link between productivity and exporting versus non-
exporting status.  Amiti and Konings (2005) focus on status of imports in terms of final versus 
intermediate goods. Another literature that is relevant considers the effect of imported versus 
indigenous input status on productivity, Feenstra et al. (1992) and Kasahara and Rodrigue (2004). The 
tendency here is to estimate TFP, without controlling for endogenous selection to a status, and in a 
second step TFP is linked to a particular status.  Clearly, it is better to allow for endogenous selection 
in the estimation of TFP in the first place. Otherwise, the TFP backed out results from a badly specified 
production function and could have spurious relationships with other variables.   4
II REFORM OF CHINESE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
Reform in China was initiated in 1978, and the process refers to institutional 
changes that move the economy from planned to a market economy. The crucial 
difference is reflected in prices, which are set by the planner in the former, and set in 
the market in the latter case. Prices under planning are often set such that inputs are 
cheap and final goods are expensive, especially industrial goods. Thus, profits from 
the industrial sector are the main source of government revenue, rather than taxes as 
in market economies. Hence, the allocation of goods in the economy is not achieved 
by demand and supply creating a price that reflects the value/scarcity of a product. 
Rather, the planner must process a wealth of information and then use this 
information in order to gear the economy toward arriving at some set of desirable 
goals, defined by quotas. Information and incentive problems lead to stockpiling and 
loss of economic prowess. Over time this system has had to reform due to these 
inefficiencies and stagnation. (Naughton, 1995).  
Since the act of planning is so complex, partial reform within planning may 
not improve efficiency significantly, but may lead to distortions, which adversely 
affect efficiency and the commitment to further reform, see Dewatripont & Roland 
(1995). However, a big bang approach, that removes all aspects of planning without 
the institutions of a market economy in place, could result in a period of 
disorganisation, which could in turn result in an initial massive fall in output as 
witnessed in the former Soviet Union; see (Repkine and Walsh, 1999) and (Konings 
and Walsh, 1999). 
In 1978 the Chinese tentatively sought for a way to avoid this problem, where 
the ‘government’s role often has been to permit change rather than to initiate it’ 
(McMillan, 1994). The planned economy was upheld, while firms bought and sold 
goods in the market, at market prices, if they were in excess of quotas regulations. 
While initial reforms in industry were deemed unsuccessful, with some retrenchment 
by 1983, there was a strong push for reforms again after 1983 (Naughton, 1995). 
Thus, we witness the birth of the Dual-Track system, which allows both planned and 
market prices to coexist for goods produced to quotas and excess goods respectively.  
 
“Beginning in 1978 […], China reformed its industrial sector. Enterprises that 
had been largely controlled by the state were given some market or market-like   5
incentives. […] State owned enterprises were allowed to keep some fraction of 
their profits, where before all profits had to be remitted to the state. Enterprises 
began to sell some of their outputs and buy some of their inputs in free 
markets, rather than selling and procuring everything at state-controlled prices” 
(Groves et al., 1994; see also Byrd 1991, Naughton 1995, Qian, 1999). 
 
In 1978 SOE’s accounted for 78 percent of industrial output, 19 percent of 
total employment (Kennedy & Marquis, 1988). The degree of state produced output 
sold at market prices rose steadily, and averaged 38 percent of state-owned 
enterprises’ output by 1989, and, in particular cases, even amounted to all output. By 
the same time on average 56 percent of inputs to state production was procured at 
market prices. (McMillan, 1994) 
By the latter half of the 1980s nearly all SOEs in our sample had completed 
this type of reform, thus having obtained the right to determine output value, pay 
bonuses, retain excess profits, and produce and sell at market prices. Also, the level of 
control was devolved from the state, or provincial level to the municipal level. We 
view these reforms as initial steps toward creating a market economy environment. 
The effect of these reforms by themselves is overviewed in Li and Wu (2002), who 
conclude that their effect was indeed limited. Groves et al. (1994) take a more 
benevolent view of initial reforms, but their results fail to establish a strong link from 
the reform process to productivity enhancement. 
Thus, the main function of initial reforms appears to be the creation of 
institutions necessary for the second stage of reforms to be successful. A standstill at 
the level of initial reform was counterproductive, as some agents made use of the 
status quo in this halfway house by trading between the co-existing parts of the 
economy. This reportedly led to a rise in social tension in the late 1980s (See Laffont 
& Qian, 1999; Dewatripont & Roland, 1995; Fang, 1994). 
It is at this point that the authorities began to appreciate the necessity to 
advance further reforms, but still they lacked a clear goal or path, which is summed 
up in the slogan crossing the river by touching stones. ‘[U]ncertainty over its vision of 
the future and aversion to risk help explain China’s initial groping reform strategy. 
…and success has sustained the continuity of a gradual evolutionary approach to 
reform.’  ( Jefferson & Singh, 1999) It was appreciated that the growth in the private 
sector could not be matched by the state-sector. One can say with respect to this   6
phenomenon that, rather than destroying the old institutions and starting from scratch, 
China let its new economy grow around what already existed, i.e. was ‘[g]rowing out 
of the Plan’. (Naughton, 1995). 
  Further reforms were initiated. Figure I and Figure II show how reforms 
evolved over time in our sample of enterprises. While the reform process began in the 
late 1980s only from the late 1980s onwards do we see autonomy over hiring and 
firing of factors which permeates most of the sample by the early 1990s.  Even though 
we see only the aggregate outcomes, careful analysis of the data shows that an 
enterprise's endeavour in one of these areas in terms of autonomy over factor markets 
tended to be followed by further reform in another aspect of factor markets. Hence 
managerial autonomy over factor inputs reforms were not taken up gradually: 
enterprises tended to select to the full package or not at all. 
   Regarding the causality of reforms, which is an important part of our analysis, 
we find support for our view that it runs from enterprise performance to reform and 
vice-versa. 
 
“Virtually all of the literature on the enterprise reform examines the impact of 
reform on performance. Causality also operated strongly in the other direction. 
[…] Indeed, the industrial innovation ladder predicts that causality should run 
from enterprise to reform” (Jefferson & Singh, 1999). 
 
  The dataset provides information on various types of reform undertaken by 
enterprises by year. The strong heterogeneity across enterprises, regions, industries 
and time, does not support a view of top-down initiated reforms. Naughton (1995) 
supports our view when he states that the ex-post apparent consistency of the reform 
process came about only because reforms were introduced in a 
heterogeneous/experimental fashion, where failures were disguised in the mass or by 
retrenchment. The information gathered in these initial, localised experiments were then 
reapplied to most SOEs in the mid-1980s, thus reducing the cost of implementation due 
to trial and error (McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Qian, 1999). It was not then a grand 
vision and divine leadership that has produced seemingly successful reform in 
Chinese SOEs, as one might be led to believe, but rather, the process was initiated 
from pressure at the grassroots level.   7
With respect to SOEs, prior to 1992 they were not privatised. Over the coming 
years there was a marked increase in levels of privatisation. Small SOEs were 
privatised at the county level and layoffs emerged at the city-level. This form of 
holding on to large enterprises was promoted by the slogan “grasping the large and 
letting go of the small”. Small- and medium-sized enterprises made up 95 percent of 
SOEs in 1993, and in many provinces about half of these were privatised by 1996. At 
this stage some ten million workers had been laid off from SOEs, and a further 11.5 
million in 1997. This appears typical of China’s initially slow pace of reform, which 
then accelerates. Large-scale layoffs were never a feature in modern China prior to 
this. This analysis does not evaluate the benefit of privatisation after 1994. However, 
it does attempt to estimate the impact of competitive pressure coming from factor 
market liberalisation on productivity at the enterprise level under state ownership. Li 
(2003) using data from 1998 models the selection of enterprises to private ownership 
and finds the same decentralised nature of the reform process. The enterprises that 
faced the most competitive pressure and hardest budget constraints where the first to 
select to privatization.  
 
III THE BEHAVIOURAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
As outlined above, the aim of this paper is to generate dynamic enterprise-
level productivity estimates. A necessary condition for this analysis is the 
computation of consistent estimates of production function parameters. Since the 
productivity variable is not measured directly in our data, the possibility that selection 
to reform, as well as choice of factors of production, should depend on productivity 
type leads to two complications when attempting to estimate the parameters of a 
production function. The first complication appears if productivity levels observed by 
managers determine input levels. Thus, we face the classic simultaneity problem 
analysed by Marshak and Andrews (1944). The second complication arises out of the 
fact that some enterprises select to reform, while others do not.  
The problems associated with entry and exit of companies is widely discussed 
in western literatures. Here we have a balanced panel of enterprises, but unbalanced 
panels of reformed and unreformed enterprises, since not all enterprises engage in 
reform, and those that do, select at different points in time. If the decision to induce 
reform is related to their productivity level, then our unbalanced panels of reformed   8
and unreformed enterprises result in part due to an endogenous selection process 
based on unobserved productivity. This would create selection bias in the production 
function estimates and lead to inconsistent estimates of production function 
parameters 
Enterprises across different industries are assumed to produce homogeneous 
products with Cobb-Douglas technology. The log-linear production function to be 
estimated is given by 
 
(1)     yit = β0 + βaait + βkkit + βllit + ωit + ηit 
 
Thus, the log of enterprise i's value added at time t, yit, is modelled as a function of the 
log of that enterprise’s state variables at t, namely age, ait, capital, kit, and the choice 
variable labour, lit. The error structure is comprised of a stochastic component, ηit, 
with zero expected value, and a component that represents unobserved productivity 
differences, ωit. Both ωit and ηit are unobserved, but ωit is a state variable, and thus 
affects firm’s choice variables. On the other hand ηit has zero expected value given 
current information, and hence does not affect decisions. 
  Simultaneity means OLS estimates should provide biased estimates for inputs 
if ωit is serially correlated, and the bias should be higher for more readily adjusted 
inputs. On the other hand, selection to the reform process has a negative bias on the 
capital coefficient. Enterprises with a higher capital stock have higher profits, ceteris 
paribus, and hence can select to reform with lower realisations of ωit The entry to the 
reform process may be decreasing in k, producing a negative bias in the estimate of 
the capital coefficient. 
  Whether we treat reform as an exogenous or endogenous, the manager freely 
chooses labour and real investment levels. Given that a profit motive could be argued 
to exist more when the manager has control we allow the elasticity of value added 
with respect to labour to vary when mangers have autonomy over factors, compared 
to when they do not.  In addition, the non-parametric relationship between investment 
and the observable and unobservable state variables is not specified ex-ante and can 
be allowed to differ across enterprises in unreformed and reformed states. Real 
investment, together with enterprise-level depreciation, δt, determines next period’s 
capital stock. The accumulation equations for capital and age are given by kt+1 = (1 – 
δt)kt + it and at+1  = at + 1.     9
  Two-Step Procedure: We assume that investment sequences, iit, chase 
performance to some degree and are short-run decisions that are mainly determined 
by state variables such as the observable stock of physical assets, k it, age of the 
enterprise, ait, the unobservable productivity type of the company, ωit., and the state of 
reform, rit (1 or zero). Assume that iit  = hit(ωit,  ait,, rit , kit) and more importantly can 
be  inverted and differentiated,  ωit  = hit(iit, , ait , rit  , kit),  generating the following 
regression: 
 
(2)     yit  =  βllit + φit(iit,, ait , rit  , kit) + ηit 
 
where φit(•) = β0 + βaait + βkkit + βr r it + hi(•) and is proxied with a third-order 
polynomial in iit,, ait, rit  and kit. We can allow for the possibility that the elasticity 
with respect to labour may change when the enterprise has autonomy over factors rit  
=1.  An interaction of labour with this reform dummy can control for this effect. The 
first term on the R.H.S. would be expanded to βllit+ βlrlit* rit. 
Since, one is unable to distinguish the effect of age, capital and reform on the 
investment and selection decision from that on output, we estimate our βa, βk  and βr 
using a non-linear least square estimator: 







β + eit+1 
We proxy the fifth term on the R.H.S. of the equation with a third order polynomial in 
estimates of hit, where the estimate of hit(•)= φit(• ) - β0 - βaait - βkkit - βr r it . We 
assume that ωit follows a markov process allowing use to a one period lag in the non-
linear structure for ωit.  In addition if we allowed for the possibility that the elasticity 
with respect to labour may change when the enterprise acquires the right to hire and 
fire labour in step 1, then the estimated coefficient on the interaction term times 
labour when the reform dummy equals 1 must be subtracted from the L.H.S of the 
above equation. We also include time and industry dummies in our regressions. The 
above may be re-written to allow for intercept shifts for each year and sub-industries.  
Three-Step Procedure: The estimation of the return to labour in the production 
function above can be extended to control for selection bias, the probability () it ρ  of   10
being in a reformed state (rit = 1 ) is modelled given the firm’s productivity type and 
other set of characteristics,   it X : 
 
(4)     Pr{ rit  = 1| ωit, ait , kit, Xit}=  it ρ (it, ait , kit , Xit) 
 
To estimate unbiased estimates of βl, partially linear equation is a semi-parametric 
regression model allowing for both selection and simultaneity bias, one can proxy for 
φit(•t)  with a third order polynomial in iit , ait, kit and  ρit .  This can be run on sub-
samples of enterprise in reformed and unreformed states to allow all for the possibility 
that the elasticity with respect to labour may chance when the enterprise has 
autonomy over factors, rit   =1, and in addition the parameters of the third order 
polynomial in iit , ait, kit and  ρit can be different. 
In step 3, to distinguish the effect of capital and age on the investment and 
selection decision from that on output, we estimate our βa and βk using a non-linear 
least square estimator: 

















We proxy the fourth term on the R.H.S. of the equation with a third order polynomial 
in estimates of hit and ρit (reform probability), where the estimate of hit(ωit, kit)= φit(iit, 
kit ) - β0 - βaait - βkkit.  We assume that ωit follows a markov process allowing use lag 
one period in the non-linear structure for ωit. Again this can be estimated in sub-
samples of enterprises in reformed and unreformed states to allow for different β’s in 
reformed and unreformed samples.  We also include time and industry dummies in 
our regressions. The above may be re-written to allow for intercept shifts for each 
year and sub-industries.  
 
IV RESULTS 
In this section the results of the regressions are reported. The summary 
statistics of the data are outlined in Table 1 and detail of data construction is outlined 
in Appendix I. Enterprises with control over factors, are older, bigger in terms of 
employment, capital and value added, and investment is larger.   11
To begin with, the reform status of an enterprise is treated as exogenous, or 
randomly assigned. In this context OLS and GLS within estimators are contrasted 
with the Olley-Pakes 2-step estimator in Table 2. The standard errors of the Olley-
Pakes coefficients are bootstrapped and clustered by 2-digit industry codes. 
Comparing GLS estimates and the Olley-Pakes 2-step, see that the co-efficient on 
labour is higher than the Olley-Pakes first-step estimates. Also, the GLS estimates for 
the co-efficient on capital are significantly lower than the Olley-Pakes second stage 
estimates. The reform dummy estimated in the second step and its interaction with 
labour is significant and positive in Olley-Pakes two-step estimates as in the OLS 
regression but are negative when we use the within group estimator. We report 
aggregated productivity measures for each year aggregating over reformed and 
unreformed enterprises using our 2-step Olley-Pakes consistent estimates, where 
productivity is measured as TFPit = exp( yit – βl lit – βa ait - βk kit ). Productivity in 
table 4 is a weighted average of enterprise productivity, weighted by real value added, 
suggest that the Olley-Pakes 2-step productivity estimate is to some degree larger for 
the set of reformed versus the unreformed enterprises after 1984. In  Figures III the 
distribution of our estimates of productivity across reformed and non-reformed 
enterprises are compared, by graphing the log distributions computed from using a 
simple OLS model, GLS and 2-step Olley and Pakes procedure. The imposed 
distribution allows us to easily compare productivity distributions across graphs. 
Differences in productivity distributions across reformers and non-reformers are not 
that pronounced across the reformed and non-reformed population. 
We next allow for the reform status of an enterprise to be endogenous to its 
productivity type in our 3-step procedure. After estimating the labour coefficient for 
both sub-samples, one progresses by estimating coefficients for age and capital, 
allowing semi-parametrically for simultaneity and selection bias in the unobservable 
productivity. By splitting the sample according to reform status, technology is 
implicitly allowed to vary across the sub-samples, as it the investment decision and its 
relation to state variables. The standard errors of the Olley-Pakes coefficients are 
bootstrapped and clustered by 2-digit industry codes. 
  In Table 5 we note that the coefficient on labour drops and capital increases 
significantly relative to the GLS estimator. In the unreformed sub-sample the return to 
observable factors is higher, but what about the evolution of the unobservable? In   12
Table 6 and 7 we again report unit and output weighted average aggregate TFP 
estimates. It seems clear that productivity for the reformers, allowing for an 
endogenous split of the data, is on average higher for the reformed enterprises vis-à-
vis the unreformed enterprises. Finally, in Figure IV the distribution of our estimates 
of productivity across reformed and non-reformed enterprises are compared, by 
graphing the log distributions computed from using the 3-step Olley and Pakes 
procedure. The imposed distribution allows us to easily compare productivity 
distributions across graphs. While the 3-step Olley and Pakes procedure produces 
lower productivity estimates, on average, across reformers and non-reformers, the 
difference between the reformed and non-reformed population is much more 
pronounced. This highlights the importance of allowing for selection to reform biases 
when one is estimating productivity dynamics during institutional change. The 
adapted 3-step Olley and Pakes procedure allows us to do this with relative ease. 
 
V CONCLUSION 
Using a unique balanced panel of 680 State-Owned Enterprises in the 
industrial sector of China during 1980 to 1994 we outline a methodology to estimate 
productivity dynamics allowing for the level and changes in the unobservable to be 
affected by discrete endogenous enterprise-level institutional change, among other 
factors. 
Consistent production function estimates were found using an adapted 
algorithm, initially outlined in Olley and Pakes (1996), which allows one to control 
for simultaneity and (our innovation) endogenous selection to reform biases. This 
gave us dynamic productivity estimates that allows for consistent comparisons across 
groups and time. The conclusion of this analysis is that enterprises that exhibited 
better performance were more likely to take control over factor inputs and such 
competitive pressures induced further productivity improvements under state 












Whole Sample  Non-Reformed  Reformed 
Age 
Obs               10185 
Mean           27.04 
Std. Dev.      13.59 
Obs                7287 
Mean           24.93 
Std. Dev.      13.12 
Obs                   2898
Mean                32.32
Std. Dev.          13.31
Value Added 
 
Obs                9355 
Mean            1899.6 
Std. Dev.      3975.7 
Obs                6650 
Mean           1659.9 
Std. Dev.      3777.5
Obs                   2705
Mean          2488.924
Std. Dev.     4370.535
Labour 
Obs               10025 
Mean            1719.5 
Std. Dev.     2705.5 
Obs                 7133 
Mean           1682.2 
Std. Dev.      2662.5
Obs                   2892
Mean              1811.5
Std. Dev.        1992.9
Capital 
Obs             9269 
Mean            2056.8 
Std. Dev.     4634.5 
Obs                   6618
Mean          1813.473
Std. Dev.      4100.22
Obs                   2651
Mean              2664.1
Std. Dev.        5711.6
Investment 
Obs                9344 
Mean             316.0 
Std. Dev.        444.0 
Obs.                7062 
Mean              09.82 
Std. Dev.        2573.0
Obs                   2282
Mean              335.09
Std. Dev.        1992.9
Reform Dummy 
Obs               10185 
Mean              0.28 
Std. Dev.        0.45 
Obs                 7287 
Mean                   0 
Std. Dev.             0 
Obs                   2898
Mean                  1 
Std. Dev.             0 
Notes : This table provides the summary statistics for the entire sample of, and sub-samples of non-
reformed and reformed, enterprises of variables central to the analysis. All variables are in 10,000 
Yuan, apart from Age (Years), Labour (average number of workers), and reform dummy equal to one 
when an enterprise has control over either the hiring and firing of labour, investment, the buying and 
selling of assets and the right to buy and sell intermediates on international markets, zero otherwise.  
Statistics reported are: the number of observations (Obs.) considered, and their mean score (Mean) and 








Table 2 Alternative Estimates of Production Function Parameters Assuming Random Selection 















































Time Trend  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fifth Order 
Polynomial 
Expansio n in h 
- - 
Yes 
χ2 (5) = 4,680 
Observations 8,330  8,330  6,026 
R-sq 0.56 0.55 0.95 
Notes: The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (2) is the log of value added. In column (3), 
for the labour coefficients has log(Value Added) was the dependent variable in step 1 of Olley and 
Pakes (Labour, Labour interaction with Reform and the polynomial in Age, Capital, Reform and 
Investment). In column (3), capital and age coefficients, the dependent variable is log(Value 
Added) – b1*log(Labour) – b2*log(Labour)*log(Reform)  Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
The Olley-Pakes 2-step standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 replications, clustered by 
industry.   15
 
Table 3 Unit-Weighted Average TFP from 
the 2-Step Procedure 




Year  Mean TFP  Mean TFP 
81 1.22  - 
82 1.32  - 
83 1.69  1.64 
84 1.58  1.14 
85 1.76  2.01 
86 1.87  2.22 
87 1.94  2.07 
88 2.35  2.56 
89 2.18  2.35 
90 2.22  2.66 
91 1.89  2.47 
92 1.72  2.59 
93 2.06  2.71 
Note: This table reports the unit-weighted 
average total factor productivity estimate 
generated by the 2-Step Olley-Pakes 
algorithm, by year, for reformed and un-
reformed sub-samples. 
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Table 4 Output-Weighted Average TFP 
from the 2-Step Procedure 




Year TFP*(yi/Σy) TFP*(yi/Σy) 
81 1.43  - 
82 1.52  - 
83 2.05  1.80 
84 1.81  1.22 
85 2.01  2.28 
86 2.13  2.55 
87 2.20  2.29 
88 2.72  2.84 
89 2.49  2.64 
90 2.57  3.03 
91 2.15  2.85 
92 2.03  2.98 
93 2.47  3.20 
Note: This table reports the output-weighted 
average total factor productivity estimate 
generated by the 2-Step Olley-Pakes 
algorithm, by year, for reformed and un-
reformed sub-samples.   17
`  Table 5 OP 3-Step Productivity Estimates with Endogenous ReformSelection 
                  Sample 




















Time Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Third Order 
Polynomial Expansion 
in P & h 
Yes 
χ2 (15) = 1,783 
Yes 
χ2 (15) = 3,415 
Observations 1,083  4,543 
R-sq 0.96  0.93 
Notes: The regression for the labour coefficients has log(Value Added) was the dependent 
variable. (Labour, Labour interaction with Reform and the polynomial in Age, Capital,   
Investment and the probability of been a reformer). For capital and age coefficients, the dependent 
variable is log(Value Added) – b1*log(Labour).  Figures in brackets are standard errors. Olley-
Pakes 3-step standard errors in brackets, bootstrapped with 1000 replications clustered by 
industry. 
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Table 6 Unit-Weighted Average TFP 
Estimates from 3-Step OP 




Year  Mean TFP  Mean TFP 
81 0.32  - 
82 0.34  - 
83 0.41  2.31 
84 0.39  1.2 
85 0.42  1.7 
86 0.44  2.71 
87 0.44  2.48 
88 0.52  2.62 
89 0.48  2.65 
90 0.48  2.73 
91 0.40  2.66 
92 0.35  2.78 
93 0.42  2.71 
Note: This table reports the unit-weighted 
average total factor productivity estimate 
generated by the 3-Step Olley-Pakes 
algorithm, by year, for reformed and un-
reformed sub-samples.   19
 
 
Table 7 Output-Weighted Average TFP 
Estimates from 3-Step OP 




Year TFP*(yi/Σy) TFP*(yi/Σy) 
81 0.35  - 
82 0.37  - 
83 0.47  2.5 
84 0.42  1.21 
85 0.46  1.84 
86 0.47  2.99 
87 0.47  2.65 
88 0.57  2.81 
89 0.51  2.82 
90 0.52  2.96 
91 0.34  2.97 
92 0.43  3.09 
93 0.39  3.01 
Note: This table reports the output-weighted 
average total factor productivity estimate generated 
by the 3-Step Olley-Pakes algorithm, by year, for 
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Hire & Fire of Labour
International Markets
Investment Autonomy >=2Years
Investment Autonomy < 2 Years
Capital Autonomy
 
This figure  sums up the percentage of enterprises that gained certain types of autonomy [Autonomy in 
setting output, payment of wage bonuses, hiring and firing of labour,  long-run investment (>=2 years), 
short-run investment (<2 years), importing raw materials on International Markets, and buying and 
selling of Capital Assets  over the 1980-1994 period. 
 
 



















This figure  sums up the percentage of enterprises that gained autonomy over factor markets reflecting 
a dummy equal to one when an enterprise has control over either, the hiring and firing of labour, 
investment, the buying and selling of assets and the right to buy and sell intermediates on international 
markets, zero otherwise over the 1980-1994 period.  
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Figure III: Reformed versus Unreformed State-Owned Enterprises’ Productivity Estimate 









Productivity Distribution of Reformed State Owned Enterprises
 traditional Solow residual, log















Productivity Distribution of Non-Reformed State Owned Enterprises
 traditional Solow residual, log
















Productivity Distribution of Reformed State Owned Enterprises
 Fixed EffectSolow residual, log

















Productivity Distribution of Non-Reformed State Owned Enterprises
 Fixed EffectSolow residual, log















Productivity Distribution of Reformed State Owned Enterprises
olley&pakes productivity, log

















Productivity Distribution of Non-Reformed State Owned Enterprises
olley&pakes productivity, log







Note: This figure plots the distribution of the log of productivity estimates, generated by OLS, 
GLS fixed effects, and using the Olley-Pakes 2-Step procedure for reformed and non-
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Figure IV:  Reformed versus Unreformed State-Owned Enterprises’ 







Productivity Distribution of Reformed State Owned Enterprises 
olley&pakes productivity, log,us














Productivity Distribution of Non-Reformed State Owned Enterprises
olley&pakes productivity, log,us





Note: This figure plots the distribution of the log of productivity estimates, generated by using the 
Olley-Pakes 3-Step procedure for reformed and non-reformed sub-samples. The ‘Normal’ curve is 
simply superimposed and centred on zero for illustrative purposes. 
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APPENDIX I: THE DATA 
 
In what follows we will describe our data. We will proceed by first describing general 
features of the raw data and how we have used them to generate the actual dataset we 
use in our analysis. The data are compiled from SOE surveys conducted by the 
Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), in consultation 
with a dozen economists from Michigan and Oxford Universities, as well as from the 
University of California, San Diego. These surveys are unique in detail and quality. 
In total we have four individual sets of data, which can be subdivided into two 
different types of data. The first type is contained in two sets and contains quantitative 
information on individual enterprises, which is supplied annually by each enterprise’s 
accountant. These data have been recorded over two time periods. The first dataset 
ranges from 1980 to 1989, and the second ranges from 1990 to 1994. The earlier 
dataset contains 769 enterprises, while the latter dataset contains a subset of the 
enterprises represented in the first, namely 681 enterprises.  
The second type of data is qualitative in nature, since it deals with the 
institutional environment of the firm, and also comprises two sets. The data represent 
the answers of each enterprise’s manager to a questionnaire in 1990 and 1995. Thus, 
the institutional questionnaires append the final year of the quantitative 
questionnaires, and hence they each contain information on exactly those enterprises 
that were present in the respective antecedent quantitative datasets. 
Since some the questions posed have not remained identical, it is important 
that we give a detailed account of how we constructed the variables in our dataset 
from these. We proceed by describing the features of the quantitative questionnaires 
first, followed by a description of the institutional ones. 
The 1980-1989 quantitative questionnaire contains 321 questions which are 
subdivided into twelve categories, labelled Output,  Production Expenses,  Wages, 
Labour and Personnel, Operations, Investment, Capital Accounts, Profit Accounts, 
Profit Retention and Enterprise Funds,  Supplementary Materials,  Costs of Main 
Products, and Other. 
The 1990-1994 accounts questionnaire contains 166 questions, which are 
subdivided into eight categories, Output, Input, Wages, Financial Condition, Assets, 
Liability and Equity, Investment, and Utilisation of Capacity.   29
The two institutional questionnaires are very similar. The 1990 one contains 
seventy questions in five categories, the 1995 one has eighty-four questions 
subdivided into six sections. Both have sections entitled Enterprise Characteristics, 
Contract and Management Appointment,  Relations Between Enterprise and Its 
Supervisors,  Internal Incentive Stem, and Management Characteristics. The 1995 
questionnaire has an extra section with the title Property Rights and asset Structure, 
although many of the questions were already present in the 1990 questionnaire. Of 
these two we only need to make use of the 1995 questionnaire. 
The remainder of this appendix deals with the quantitative questionnaires, and 
with how we created the variables from these, which now form our data series from 
1980 through 1994. We will subdivide this section into various categories, depending 
on the type of variable we are dealing with. 
TABLE A1: FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
 Dataset 
Variable 
Symbol 1980-1989  1990-1994 
ENTERPRISE IDENTIFIER  id  Unique Identifier for each firm {1 - 769} 
Location  loc 
Three digit number, first indicates province and last 
the district 
Industry  ind 
Number from 0 – 40, indicating the industry the firm 
belongs to 
Operation Year  Op_y  Year from which an enterprise commenced operation 
 
 
Table A1 describes some of the unchanging firm characteristics. Each of the 681 
firms has its own unique identifier in form of a firm identification number, ranging 
from 1 to 769. An enterprise’s location is given by a three digit number, where the 
first number identifies the province a company resides in, and the last identifies the 
district in that province; the middle digit is a separator and is always zero. The 
industry affiliation of an enterprise is indicated by its industry code, which is a   30
number between one and forty. The year of operation is given by a two-digit number, 
which indicates the year in the twentieth century that a firm commenced its operation.  
Table A2 is concerned with the creation of our Real Value Added Variable, 
which has been constructed from variables in the raw data and some deflators. We 
have enterprise’s value of output in present prices as well as in the prices of the base 
year for each dataset, namely 1980 and 1990. In order to get a consistent series 
spanning 1980-1994 we decided to make use of the 1980-1989 real value of output 
series, and then applied a deflator, with 1980 as base year, to the present value of 
output 1990-1994 series. The deflator supplied was by Changqi Wu. In addition, we 
have information on the value of raw materials consumed. By making use of the 
prices of the primary inputs and the quantities they were used in, we have constructed 
a firm-level material input deflator. Thus, we can create a variable that gives us the 
value of raw materials consumed at 1980 prices. When we subtract this real raw 
materials variable from real output value, we gain a variable that measures the value 
added for each enterprise in each year. 
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TABLE A2: REAL VALUE ADDED 
Dataset 
   Variable 
Symbol 1980-1989 1990-1994 
Nominal Output  Yn 
Current Price Value 
of Output in 10,000 
Yuan 
Total Value of Gross 
Output of Enterprise 
(present Value) in 10,000 
Yuan 
Base Year Output  Yr 
Actual Value of 
Output (1980 Fixed 
Prices) in 10000 
Yuan 
Total Value of Gross 
Output of Enterprise 
(based on 1990 value) in 
10,000 Yuan 
Output Deflator  ydef 
Nominal Divided by 
Real 
Output Deflator in 1980 
Prices (Li & Wu, 2002) 
OUTPUT  YR = YN/YDEF 
Actual Value of 
Output (1980 Fixed 
Prices) in 10,000 
Yuan 
Nominal Output divided 
by 1980 prices Deflator in 
10,000 Yuan 
Materials  mn 
Total Raw Material 
Consumption in 
10,000 Yuan 





Firm level raw material price index as calculated by 
Changqi, replaced by industry level deflator if 
missing. 1980 Base Year. 
REAL MATERIALS  M= MN/MDEF 
Materials Divided by the 1980 Prices Material 
Deflator 
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Table A3, the labour variable simply measures the number of employees the 
enterprise employed at year-end.  
 
 
Table A3: Labour 
Dataset  
Variable 
Symbol 1980-1989  1990-1994 
LABOUR  l 
Workers at Year 
End 




Table A4 contains information on how we created our Real Capital Stock and Real 
Investment variables. The 1980 level of the real capital stock is given by the net 
capital asset position of each enterprise. For every following year we create a new 
Real Capital Stock value, which is given by the previous year’s real capital stock, 
adjusted for firm level depreciation, to which we add Real Investment, which is 
investment in 1980 prices. Each of these constituent variables will be discussed in 
turn. Investment is deflated by a machinery output price index, with 1980 as base 
year, which yields Real Investment. Investment itself is given, where available, by 
productive fixed investment for the years 1980-1989. Where it is not available, which 
includes the years following 1989, we use the year on year change in productive 
capital. Productive Capital, in turn, is given by the cumulative value, that is adding up 
receipts of purchases, of industrial production related fixed assets for all years. We get 
firm level depreciation rates by dividing depreciation by the capital stock. For the 
years 1980 to1989 depreciation is defined as the year on year change in cumulative 
depreciation. For the years 1990 to 1994 we use depreciation of fixed assets for the 
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Table A4: Investment and Capital Stock Variables 
Dataset 
Variable 
Symbol 1980-1989  1990-1994 
Net Capital  netk 
Net Value of Fixed 




Fixed assets, at Purchase 
Price, year end 





Fixed Capital Part of 
Capital 
Original Price of Industrial 
Production Fixed Capital Part of 
Capital 
Depreciation  deprn 
Net change in cumulative 
nominal depreciation, 
year on year in 10,000 
Yuan 
Depreciation of fixed assets of 
the year in 10,000 Yuan 
Machinery Price 
Index 
mpi  Machinery Output price Index 
Real Capital  kr = kn/mpi  Capital divided by 1980 based machinery output price index 
Real 
Depreciation 
depr = deprn/mpi 




δ = depr/kr  Depreciation divided by Capital 
Investment  in  Productive Fixed Investment 
Real 
Investment 
i = in/mpi 
Investment deflated by 1980 based machinery output price 
index 
1980 1981-1994  Real Capital 
Stock 
k 
k80 = netk80  kt+1 = kt(1-δt)+ it 
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TABLE A5: REFORM VARIABLES 
                    Dataset 
Variable 
Symbol 1995  Questionaire 
Output  Autonomy  Output 
Year from which had autonomy over 
output, its value, and daily regular 
decisions 
Hiring and Firing Autonomy   Hire and Fire 
Year from which had autonomy over 
employing and dismissing workers 
Import and Export 
Autonomy 
Trade  
Year from which had autonomy over 





Year from which had autonomy over 
investment with a recovery period 




Year from which had autonomy over 
investment with a recovery period 
above two years 
Autonomy over Buying and 
Selling Assets 
Buy and Sell Assets 
Year from which had autonomy over 
the purchase and sale of assets 
Reform Dummy   Reform Dummy 
Dummy equal to one when an 
enterprise has control over either 
hiring and firing of labour, 
investment, the buying and selling of 
assets and the right to buy and sell 
intermediates on international 
markets, zero otherwise over the 
1980-1994 period.  
 
 
When a manger gets autonomy over one factor investment there is a push to be 
able to have autonomy over all. Hence we have a dummy equal to one when an 
enterprise has control over any factor.  